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Comments and Casenotes
PLEADING NEGLIGENCE IN MARYLAND-
RES IPSA LOQUITUR AS A RULE OF PLEADING
By JOSEPH 0. KAIsER*
In the recent case of Livingstone v. Stewart & Co., Inc.,'
plaintiff's declaration alleged that the defendant conducted
a department store in Baltimore where the plaintiff and the
public were invited to enter as customers to inspect or pur-
chase goods and merchandise. On December 20, 1948 while
the plaintiff, in response to the invitation, was in the de-
fendant's store and looking at various toys, a "two-wheel
bicycle" fell on the plaintiff, pinning her leg against a show
case or fixture in the store, as a result of which the plain-
tiff's leg was most seriously injured. The declaration further
alleged that the accident and resultant injuries were caused
solely through and by the carelessness, recklessness and
negligence of the agents of the defendant and through no
fault on the part of the plaintiff.
In answer to a demand for particulars, the plaintiff said
the facts constituting recklessness, carelessness and negli-
gence on the part of the agents of the defendant were
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant inas-
much as the instrumentality causing the injury complained
of was within the control of, and under the management and
supervision of the defendant, its agents, servants and
employees.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the declaration
as limited by the bill of particulars, and thereafter, the
plantiff having failed to amend, entered a judgment for the
defendant, which was affirmed on appeal. The declaration
"contains only the argumentative conclusion that the Plain-
tiff's injuries were caused by the Defendant's negligence,
but states no acts done or left undone by the Defendant
which constitute negligence or a negligent manner of doing
anything".2 The requirement that a declaration must in-
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; Lecturer on Pleading, University of Mary-
land School of Law; A.B. (1933) Johns Hopkins University; LLB. (1936)
University of Maryland.
169 A. 2d 900, (Md., 1949).
2 Ibid., 901.
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clude facts of negligent conduct and not merely circum-
stantial evidence from which the facts may be inferred,
applies where the plaintiff relies upon the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
The system of pleading which prevails in Maryland is
intended to be issue producing.3 One of its essential and
fundamental principles is "that facts should be stated 'for
the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to de-
clare the law arising upon those facts, and to apprise the
opposite party of what is meant to be proved in order to
give him an opportunity to answer or traverse it' ".4
The opinion of the Court in the instant case states that
at common law, and especially in Maryland, no great par-
ticularization of facts and circumstances is necessary in
stating a cause of action for negligence.5 However, under
the Maryland system of simplified common law pleading,6
in stating a cause of action for negligence, there must be
"certain and definite allegation of the circumstances" suf-
ficient to show a duty owed by the defendant to plaintiff, a
breach of that duty and resulting injury. "The general
characterization of an act or omission as negligent or of a
condition as unsafe is not usually a sufficient statement.""
Thus, a rather flexible standard is presented to the
Maryland practitioner for his use in stating a cause of action
for negligence. A survey of the Maryland statutory forms
and the Maryland cases will demonstrate that where the
plaintiff's right and the defendant's corresponding duty
are simple and easily perceived, a simple factual statement
of the defendant's act or omission in breach thereof, coupled
with the general characterization of the defendant's act
or omission as negligent, will suffice. On the other hand,
the less apparent the plaintiff's right and the defendant's
duty, the more likely the pleader will be required to specify
the acts or omissions relied upon to constitute the negligent
conduct. Otherwise stated, in simple situations involving
8 PoE: PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th ed.. 1925), Vol. 1, Sec. 541.
Gent v. Cole, 38 Md. 110, 113 (1878) ; see Md. Code (1939), Art. 75, Sec. 2.
8 Supporting this statement as to the common law see, CLARK: HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, (2nd ed., 1947), p. 300:
"Under the common law precedents it was customary to state in fairly
general form what the defendant's act was and to characterize it as
negligent."
Early Maryland precedents for forms of declarations for negligence con-
tain allegations no less general. HARMs' MODERN ENTRIES (1831), Vol. 1,
pp. 292-301 (Declarations in Assumpsit), pp. 351-354 (Declarations in Case).
' The origin of this system is usually traced to the Act of 1856, ch. 112.
See, POE, op. cit., n. 2, secs. 56-60, Chap. XXII.
I Supra, n. 1, 901.
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an easily recognized breach of duty, a general averment
of negligence following a simple statement of the defen-
dant's act or omission will be regarded as an ultimate fact;
while in more complex situations where the breach of duty
is not readily apparent, such an averment will be regarded
as a mere legal conclusion."
CARRIER-PASSENGER CASES
Since a common carrier is required to exercise a high
degree of care for the safety of its passengers,9 the code
form merely prescribes:' 0
"That the defendant is a corporation, owning a rail-
road between B and C; that the plaintiff was a passen-
ger on said railroad, and by reason of the insufficiency
of an axle of the car in which he was riding, the plain-
tiff was hurt; and the defendant did not use due care
in reference to said axle, but the plaintiff did use due
care.""1
A note to this form provides:' 2 "This form may be
varied so as to adapt it to many cases by merely changing
the allegation as to the cause of the accident." A declara-
tion in Phil. B. & W. R. Co., v. Allen" was held to conform to
the requirements of the Code. The important allegations
of the declaration were that the defendant "so negligently
and unskillfully conducted itself in carrying the plaintiff
and in managing the said railroad and the car and train in
which the plaintiff was a passenger.., that the plaintiff...
was thereby thrown down and wounded and injured....
The Court in considering the declaration said: 15
"Here, then is a distinct statement of the duty owed
by the carrier to the passenger; and a like averment of
the breach of that duty in the negligent and unskillful
management of the railroad, and the car and the train,
whereby the plaintiff was thrown down and injured.
The dry allegation of fact is that the company negli-
8 The wide diversity of opinion upon the question whether negligence is an
ultimate fact to be stated as such or a conclusion of law to be deducted from
facts warranting such an inference may be seen in the cases collected in
59 L. R. A. 209.
1 Jackson v. Hines, 137 Md. 621, 626, 113 A. 129 (1920).
10 Md. Code (1939), Art. 75, Sec. 28 (36).
11 See the same form in 2 CHrITY PLEADING (16th Am. Ed., 1876), p. 575.
2Supra, n. 10.
2" 102 Md. 110, 62 A. 245 (1905).
"Ibid., 111.Ibid., 114.
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gently managed its railroad and train and car; but the
evidentiary facts proving or tending to prove that
negligence are not set forth, and there was no occasion
to aver them. The asserted negligence and not the
facts which proved the negligence constituted the
cause of action. Negligence may be made manifest by
a variety of circumstances; but whatever the eviden-
tiary circumstances may be, the thing they prove if
they have probative value at all is negligence and
negligence in respect of some designated act of com-
mission or omission is the thing to be proved, and there-
fore the thing to be alleged in the pleading. In this in-
stance it was alleged to be the negligence of the com-
pany in managing its railroad and the car and train in
which the plaintiff was a passenger; and that this aver-
ment sufficiently apprised the defendant of the charge
it was required to answer is apparent from the cir-
cumstances that it entered the plea of not guilty and
proceeded to trial thereon instead of challenging the
declaration by a demurrer on the ground of vagueness
and uncertainty. An averment that the cause of the
injury was the negligence of the company in manag-
ing its railroad and the car and train in which the
plaintiff was a passenger is a definite statement of the
fact upon which the plaintiff relied to sustain a re-
covery, and did not need to be amplified by a recital of
other facts which, if established, merely proved that
there had been negligence in the management of the
railroad and train and car in which the plaintiff was a
passenger."
The rule of pleading applied in the Allen case, and illus-
trated in the above code form, was relied upon in Smith v.
N. C. Rwy. Co.,"6 to overrule a demurrer to a declaration
which alleged that the plaintiff, a gratuitous passenger, had
sustained personal injuries when he slipped upon a sheet
of ice while crossing a passenger platform, and that the
accident was caused by gross negligence on the part of the
defendants, its agents and servants.
NEGLIGENCE IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC WAYS
In Maryland the duty of a municipality to keep streets
and sidewalks under its control reasonably safe for travel,
6119 Md. 481, 87 A. 259 (1912). See also Hanway v. B. & 0. R. Co., 126
Md. 535, 95 A. 160 (1915) ; Lusby v. Balto. Transit Co., 72 A. 2d 754 (1950).
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and to prevent and remove any nuisance affecting their
use and safety, is well established. 7 The Code form to re-
cover for injuries due to disrepair of streets simply
provides: 8
"That the defendant is an incorporated city, and is
bound to keep its streets in repair; that one of its
streets, called ................ Street, was negligently suffered
by the defendant to be out of repair, whereby the plain-
tiff, in traveling on said street and using due care, was
hurt."19
This form does not contain an allegation that the city
had actual or constructive notice of the need for repair,
which is an essential element of proof to hold the municipal-
ity in such cases. But the form implies a failure to repair
after such notice.20
This code form was referred to in Phelps v. Howard
County,21 where the averments of the declaration were
said to present an issue of fact. The plaintiff, while riding
the "lazy board" of a wagon, was injured when it collided
with a telegraph pole. The declaration alleged that con-
trary to their duty to keep the public road safe for travel,
the defendant Telegraph Company, with the permission of
the defendant County Commissioners, had erected a tele-
graph pole in a dangerous position in a designated public
road by placing the pole in the side of the highway and so
close to the traveled portion thereof that the part of a hay
carriage, known as the "lazy board," which extends from
the center of the carriage about two feet beyond its tread,
would collide with the pole while the wagon was in the
traveled portion of the road.
Relying on this and other code forms, the Court in Mayor,
etc. of Salisbury v. Camden Sewer Co.,2 2 found sufficient
the following allegations of negligence: 23
"that... especially for three years last past, the said de-
fendant has so negligently and carelessly maintained
said catch basins . . . and has so negligently and care-
17 Neuenschwander v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm., 187 Md. 67, 48 A. 2d 593,
596 (1946).UMd. Code (1939), Art. 75, Sec. 28 (37).
19 See similar form in 2 CrrTY, op. cit., supra, n. 11, 575.
2W. B. & A. R. Co. v. Cross, 142 Md. 500, 505, 121 A. 374 (1923) ; Neuen-
schwander v. Wash. Sub. San. Comm., supra, n. 17.
117 Md. 175, 82 A- 1058 (1912).
"141 Md. 254, 118 A. 662 (1922).
"Ibid., 259..
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lessly permitted said surface water to be drained into
the eastern portion of plaintiff's said sewer . . ., as to
cause said part of said sewer to become filled up with
said debris. .. ."
In W. B. & A. R. Co. v. Cross,24 the following charge of
negligence was held to imply a failure to repair a bridge and
remove an obstruction after notice, and to indicate sufficient
causal connection between the conditions and fright of a
horse: 2 5
".. -that the bridge was maintained in a negligent
manner, to wit, a board out of the floor and an ob-
struction placed across the same in such a way that
while the plaintiff was driving across the said bridge
with her horse and buggy, the horse, while on said
bridge, and near the said obstruction and open floor,
became frightened, and ran away and threw the plain-
tiff out...."
Without reference to the code form, the allegations of
a declaration in Mayor, etc. of Havre de Grace v. Fletcher,28
were held sufficient to charge a negligent failure to abate
a dangerous nuisance. The charge was that the defendant
municipality, neglecting its duty to care for its streets,
permitted certain persons who conducted a hotel, to stack
beer kegs on or near one of the traveled streets: 27
"in such a negligent manner as to be dangerous to
persons passing along and upon said street and failed
and neglected to remove the same and failed and
neglected to require the said . . . to remove the said
beer kegs so negligently stacked by them on said street,
")28
But in Anne Arundel County v. Carr,29 the following
allegation of negligence was held entirely too general in
not specifying how the bridge was out of repair or unsafe: 30
2 Supra, n, 20.
Ibid.
112 Md. 562, 77 A. 114 (1910).
Ibid., 567.
21The declaration went on to allege that the defendant hotel owners negli-
gently stacked a number of beer kegs on a certain date to a height of about
eight feet and that one of the kegs fell by reason of the negligent and
dangerous manner in which they had been piled. The sufficiency of these
allegations as against the defendant hotel owners is not discussed.
2,111 Md. 141, 73 A. 668 (1909).
- Ibid., 144.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
"That one of the bridges . . . then and there a part
of said public road, was negligently and carelessly
suffered by said defendants to be out of repair and in
an unsafe condition for travel and by reason of the
negligence and carelessness of said County Commis-
sioners, allowing said bridge to be out of repair and in
an unsafe condition for travel, the said Plaintiff ...
was greatly injured by reason of the horse breaking
through said bridge....
This decision does not refer to the code forms. The de-
fendant had relied principally upon a ground other than
indefiniteness in demurring. However, the court appar-
ently on its own motion, noticed the defect of indefiniteness
and reversed a judgment for the plaintiff for error in over-
ruling the demurrer and for error in granting a prayer of
the plaintiff.
More particularization of the facts and circumstances
than required by the code form and the above cases may
be necessary to demonstrate that the negligent failure to
abate a nuisance in the form of an obstruction on a public
way is the proximate and not the remote cause of the in-
jury involved.8'
INDIVIDUALS RENDERING PUBLIC WAYS MORE HAZARDOUS
The Maryland law recognizes that if an individual,
whether an adjoining owner or not, does any act which
renders the use of a public street or sidewalk more hazard-
ous or less secure than it was left by the public authorities.
he commits a nuisance and is liable to one who is injured
in consequence. The ouestion in such cases is due and
proner care under the circumstances.82
In Neighbors v. Leatherman,88 an adjoining pronerty
owner was sought to be held responsible for a traveler's in-
juries under the following allegations: 8
"That the defendant is the owner of a mill situated
in Lewistown District. Frederick County, Maryland.
along the Frederick and Emmitsburg Turnnike in said
county. and had installed and placed in said mill a
steam engine, an exhaust pine of and from which he
(the defendant) had, the ,laintiff avers,. negligently
II Mayor, etc. of Hazerstown v. Foltz. 113 Md. 52. 104 A. 267 (1910).
" Citizens savings Bk. v. Covington, 174 Md. 633, 199 A. 849 (1938).
"116 Md. 484. 82 A. 152 (1911).
Ibid., 486.
[VOL. XI
1950] PLEADING NEGLIGENCE IN MARYLAND 109
and wrongfully placed and permitted to extend in such
a manner as to expel the smoke therefrom, out over the
said turnpike or public road aforesaid, negligently and
wrongfully permitted and suffered to be discharged
and emitted therefrom large quantities of steam, much
to the annoyance, inconvenience and danger of those
rightfully using said public road or turnpike; and that
the plaintiff, while using due care, driving along said
turnpike in a funeral procession, in a vehicle occupied
by himself, his wife and child, his horse going at a very
slow gait, was, by reason of the negligence and care-
lessness of the defendant, in that the defendant negli-
gently and wrongfully caused and permitted to escape
from said exhaust pipe large volumes of dense and
thick steam, by reason of which said steam the horse
the plaintiff was driving became frightened, then and
there kicked and threw the plaintiff out of the vehicle
to the ground."
These allegations were held to be too general and in-
definite. However, the declarations in Cecil Paper Co. v.
Nesbitt35 and Newnam v. Moran,86 were held to be suffici-
ently definite.
NEGLIGENCE BY BAILEE
The Code includes, under the heading "For Wrongs In-
dependent of Contract", the following form:"
"That the defendant hired from the plaintiff a horse
to ride from Frederick to Hagerstown, and thence back
to Frederick, in a proper manner; the defendant rode
said horse so immoderately that he became lame and
injured in value."38
The duty of a hirer of a chattel to use care, whether con-
tractually assumed or in many instances coextensively im-
posed by operation of tort law, is readily recognized, and
the above Code form merely requires a simple statement
of the duty and breach without particularization of the
details.
117 Md. 59, 83 A. 254 (1912).
154 Md. 650, 141 A. 385 (1927).
'Md. Code (1939), Art. 75, Sec. 28 (38).
See a similar form in 2 C-mrry, op. cit., supra, n. 11, 145. 1 HARIxs,
op. cit., supra, n. 5, lists a similar form "for immoderate riding a horse",
but contains allegations suggesting breach of contract.
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The code forms of pleadings are preceded by the state-
ment that "like forms may be used with such modifications
as may be necessary to meet the facts of the case", and it
is not erroneous "to depart from said forms so long as sub-
stance is expressed".39 This provision would seem to be
ample authority that the simplicity and terseness of the
illustrative forms should be carried over to allow the
pleading of ultimate facts in the statement of other causes
of action for negligence. But the Maryland decisions re-
quire a varying amount of detail to be presented in pleading
other negligence cases than those covered by the illustra-
tive code forms.
HIGHWAY COLLISION CASES
At present, highway collision cases make up the bulk of
the negligence cases presented to our courts. In many
such cases the force and injury are direct and an action of
trespass may be maintained. 40 Where, instead, the remedy
of case was elected or required, the early common law
precedents simply contained an averment of facts showing
the duty and the general manner of its breach.4 To the
trained mind, such cases are quite clear, the breach of duty
generally involves violation of the rules of the road or one
or more of a limited number of misdeeds. Without the
necessity of detailed pleadings, experienced counsel con-
sider their contingency in preparing for trial since the free-
dom of amendment allows the pleader to supply omissions
during the trial. Moreover, depositions and discovery pro-
cedure, rather than the pleadings, are relied upon to pro-
vide notice of the factual issues.
In American Express Co. v. Denowitch,42 the suit was
to recover damages by reason of the death of an infant
child. The declaration averred that the defendant, by its
agents and servants, operated a motor truck on Baltimore
Street near High Street in Baltimore, and the agents and
servants of the defendant negligently and carelessly caused
the motor truck to run into and against the infant. This
declaration was held to contain all the essential and legal
requirements necessary to constitute a good cause of action.
Though there was filed with it the statutorily required bill
"Md. Code (1939), Art. 75, See. 28.
40 1 HARRIS', Op. cit., 8upra, n. 38, p. 353; Parker v. Providence & Stonington
Steamboat Co., 17 R. I. 376, 22 A. 102, 33 Am. St. Rep. 869, 14 L. R. A. 414
(1892).
1 HARRIs', op. cit., 8upra, n. 38, pp. 351-354.
£2132 Md. 72, 103 A. 96 (1918).
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of particulars, this did not amplify the general charge of
negligence.4 3
MALPRACTICE CASES
In the field of malpractice cases, two decisions should be
noted. Fink v. Steele," involved a charge of negligent
treatment of a child by a dentist. The following allegations
were held sufficient to give notice to the defendant of the
claim that for a period of five days he had failed to exercise
the degree of care required of one in his profession and that
as a result, the plaintiff had suffered injury:
".. . on or about April 3rd, 1931, the plaintiff was a
patient of the defendant, a practicing dentist at Elkton,
Maryland, at which time the defendant . . . filled a
tooth of the said infant plaintiff, and that said filling
remained in said tooth for a period of five days,
whereby said infant plaintiff suffered great physical
injury, both serious and permanent; that said injuries
to said infant plaintiff were caused directly by said
defendant in filling said tooth and allowing said filling
to remain in said tooth for five days, and that the filling
of said tooth and the permitting said filling to remain in
said tooth for a period of five days was due to want of
reasonable care, skill and diligence on the part of the
said defendant...."
Keyser v. Richard, 45 involved a suit against five defen-
dants to recover for pain and suffering allegedly caused by
negligent treatment in the nursing and care of a student.
The declaration covers six pages in the official report and is
largely a chronogolical statement of the events extending
over a two month period which led to the student's death.
The following general allegation was made: 46
"Each and all of the defendants, acting in their re-
spective position and spheres and along the respective
lines above stated, jointly participated in the care and
management of the said C. Bernard Keyser during his
last illness and during all the time hereinbefore men-
tioned; that they each and all undertook to exercise due
Compare Seeger v. Janocka, Baltimore City Court, O'Dunne, J., Daily
Record, March 17, 1941. This opinion concludes that a narr. in an auto-
mobile accident case must include more than the general averments that the
defendant operated his car in a careless, reckless and negligent manner.
"166 Md. 354, 171 A. 49 (1934).
"148 Md. 669, 130 A. 41 (1925).
-Ibid., 676.
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and ordinary care in the premises, and that they each
and all jointly and severally failed to exercise ordinary
care and prudence in connection with the treatment,
nursing and care of the said C. Bernard Keyser during
his last illness, but were guilty of gross negligence in
connection therewith, and that by said conduct theyjointly and severally gravely aggravated the illness
of the said C. Bernard Keyser, and caused him great
physical and mental pain and suffering."
The Court held that the general allegation was only the
conclusion of the pleader or his interpretation of the pre-
ceding specific charges and was inconsistent with their
meaning and effect. Treated separately, the general allega-
tion was held too indefinite.4 7
CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC WORKS
In this State, a municipal corporation does not insure
its citizens against damage from works of its construction,
and, absent a taking or actual physical invasion of prop-
erty, is liable only for negligence. The frequently cited
case of Frisch v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore,49 requires the
declaration in such cases to apprise the defendant of the
particular charge of neglect which it will be required to
meet at the trial. The declaration there held demurrable
alleged that the plaintiffs ° "were tenants in lawful posses-
sion of a part of the premises known as No. 420 W. Lexing-
ton Street ... that ... the premises of said plaintiffs were
flooded with water as a result of the breaking and bursting
of certain water pipes in the alley to the rear of said
premises, said water pipes being designed and used for
the purpose of supplying water to the entire building and
premises, whereby the stock merchandise of said plaintiffs
was ruined and damaged, . . . that all the loss, injury and
damage aforesaid was caused by the negligence and want
of care of said defendants and each of them, in the installa-
tion, maintenance, and failure to repair said water
pipes ....
" The broad reference to negligence at the close of a declaration usual In
Maryland is not taken as an allegation of negligence in other respects or in
addition to the negligence specified. Greenwald v. McLaughlin, 160 Md. 341,
153 A. 34 (1931).
Hanrahan v. Mayor etc. of Baltimore, 114 Md. 517, 80 A. 312 (1911).
19 156 Md. 310, 144 A. 478 (1929).
Ibid., 311.Of. Mayor, etc. of Salisbury v. Camden Sewer CO., supra, n. 22.
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NEGLIGENCE AS TO FIRES
Liability for communicating fire to the property of
others in the course of lawful work must be predicated
upon the lack of ordinary care and prudence under the
circumstances of the particular case. American Paving &
Contracting Co. v. Davis52 illustrates the reasonable cer-
tainty in the averments required in such cases.
MASTER AND SERVANT CASES
Perhaps the most frequently cited case on the sufficiency
of a declaration in an action of negligence in Maryland is
the case of State of Maryland, use of Jeter v. Schwind
Quarry Company.3 The substance of the declaration there
involved is stated as follows:54
"For that the defendant corporation at the time of
the commission of the wrong and injury hereinafter
mentioned, was operating a stone quarry in the city
of Baltimore, and Edward Jeter, the husband and
father of the equitable plaintiffs was employed by it as
a stone cutter. And it was the duty of the defendant
corporation to provide the said Jeter with a reasonably
safe and proper place in which to work, and with
reasonably safe and proper tools with which to work,
and to employ reasonably competent co-employees,
and to promulgate rules for their government, and to
refrain from exposing the said Jeter to unnecessary
risk and danger while at work. And the plaintiff in
fact says that on the day and date mentioned, the said
Jeter was directed by one of the employees of said
corporation, then and there in command of said
quarry, and having authority over him, to extract a
charge of blasting powder theretofore placed in a hole
drilled in a rock in said quarry, for which work the
said Jeter was not 'skilled, fitted, or employed, and of
the danger of which he was ignorant and unwarned,
and in the execution of which he was killed. And the
plaintiff further says that the death of the said Jeter
was directly due to the negligence of the defendant
corporation in discharge of its aforesaid duties toward
him, to wit, the duties to provide him with a reasonably
u127 Md. 477, 96A. 623 (1915).
5397 Md. 696, 55 A. 366 (1903).
Ibid., 697.
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safe and proper place in which to work, and with
reasonably safe and proper tools with which to work,
and to employ competent co-employees, and to promul-
gate rules for their government, and to refrain from ex-
posing him to unnecessary risk and danger whilst at
work, and that the said Jeter used due care, but the
defendant corporation did not use due care ......
Of the allegations, other than the italicised portions of
the declaration, the Court said:"
"The defendant is not told what specific duty is
claimed to have been neglected, but is required to
meet a charge of general misconduct in the alleged
neglect of every duty imposed upon it by law. Not
only so, but there is no averment of the manner in
which any one of these duties have been violated. It
does not specifly in what respect the place provided
for work was unsafe, or how the want of safety caused
the death; it does not specify what tools provided for
work were unsafe, in what respect they were unsafe,
or how their unsafe condition was connected with the
accident; it does not state what co-employees were
incompetent, or how their incompetency contributed
to cause the death of the deceased. It does not show
what rules should have been promulgated for the gov-
ernment of employees, or how the failure to promul-
gate them is connected with the accident, nor does it
state what was the risk and danger to which the de-
ceased was unnecessarily exposed while at work.
"Such a lumping aggregation of general charges of
neglect of duty, without a single specification upon
which to prepare a defense cannot be regarded as
gratifying the fundamental principles of pleading
which are still recognized and enforced in our simpli-
fied system, as we have recently had occasion to ob-
serve in Edger v. Burke, reported in 96 Md. 715."
The italicized portion of the declaration was found to be
scarcely less general and vague: 56
"It does not state what was the nature of the
danger, against which he should have been warned.
It does not charge that it was unknown to the servant,
Ibid., 699.
Ibid., 701.
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or not open and obvious to ordinary observation, and
therefore one against which it was the master's duty to
warn the servant. There is no averment that his
death was caused by his want of skill for the work he
was directed to perform, or by the failure to warn him
of the danger. There is in fact no statement what-
ever of any cause of his death, but a mere averment
that he was killed in the execution of the work."
SuiTs AGAINST PERSONS OTHER THAN EmPLOYER
Happily, the advent of the Workmen's Compensation
Act has made almost entirely unnecessary the drafting of
pleadings with an eye to the harsh rules of the common law
as to the liability of a master for injuries to his servant.
However, in suits by an employee against a person other
than his employer to recover for injuries due to defective
and unsafe premises, 7 averments of actual knowledge of
the defective and unsafe condition of the premises by the
defendant or reliance by the employee upon an inspection
system maintained by the defendant, must be contained in
the declaration.58
In such suits to recover for injuries due to inadequate
or defective machinery or appliances, the defendant will be
held to a duty to use ordinary care to provide reasonably
adequate and safe appliances and by reasonable inspection
to keep them in a reasonably safe condition.5 9
In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Union Bridge Electric Mfg.
Co.,60 a suit filed by an insurer for its own use and for the
use of the dependents of a deceased employee against an
alleged tort feasor, the Court held the following allegation
of negligence sufficiently definite and certain: 61
"... that the death of the said Benton W. Arbaugh was
directly caused by the negligence and want of care of
the agents and servants of the said defendant in main-
taining an unprotected, highly charged wire within a
few inches of the roof of said school house and without
negligence or want of care on the part of the said
Benton W. Arbaugh."
5 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 101, Sec. 59.
5 State, use of Fisher v. C. & P. Tel. Co., 162 Md. 572, 160 A. 437 (1932);
Bohlen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 67 A. 2d 251 (Md. 1949).
Petrol Corporation v. Curtis, 59 A. 2d 329 (Md. 1948).
145 Md. 644, 125 A. 762 (1924).
Ibi., 647.
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NEGLIGENCE IN TRESPASSER, LICENSEE AND INVITEE CASES
Other persons present upon the land of another are
customarily considered in Maryland as trespassers, licensees
or invitees. Toward trespassers, the landowner owes
the duty to refrain from wilful or wanton injury, and upon
discovery of the trespasser's presence or peril, to exercise
reasonable care to protect him from the consequences of
his indiscretion. - General affirmations of negligence and
want of care which do not disclose breach of such duty
by the defendant will be held insufficient on demurrer in
such cases 8
Similarly, one upon the land of another by permission,
as distinguished from invitation or inducement, is obliged
to use the subject of the license as he finds it, with all its
concomitant conditions and perils. Here again, general
allegations of negligence, not showing that the landowner
has covertly altered the property so as to create an unex-
pected peril, or that the landowner, when actually aware
of the licensee's presence, failed to take reasonable care to
prevent injury to him after knowledge of impending
danger, will be deemed insufficient.64
Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Constr. Co.,65 involved a
suit by an invitee to recover for injuries sustained by reason
of an allegedly dangerous condition in an office building.
Negligence was predicated upon a failure to provide safe-
guards at a window in a hallway through which window
the plaintiff fell and sustained serious injuries. The
declaration alleged that plaintiff's injuries were caused:
"by the negligence of the defendant, its agents, serv-
ants and employees, in that it permitted a dangerously
low window in the public hallway to be open beside
the elevator buttons and shafts, without a bar or guard
as aforesaid, knowing that the public generally, in-
cluding persons who were weak and infirm, or per-
"See Note, Liability of Railroad to Intruders Crossing its Right of Way,
3 M. L. R. 344, 347-348 (1939).
State, use of Alston v. Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co., 176 Md. 341,
4 A. 2d 739 (1939).
61 Jackson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 176 Md. 1, 3 A. 2d 719 (1939), Noted
3 M. L. R. 344, op. cit., supra, n. 62. In Petrol Corporation v. Curtis, 8upra,
n. 59, 331, the Court of Appeals quotes with apparent approval the rule of
2 RESTATEMENT TORTS, Sec. 341, which subjects a possessor of land to lia-
bility to visitors or gratuitous licensees from harm caused them by failure
to carry on activities with reasonable care for their safety unless they knew
or should have known of the activities and risks involved.
,183 Md. 285, 37 A. 2d 263 (1944).
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sons who were or might become faint, had to come to
the window in order to signal the elevators, without
any negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing
thereto."
The declaration was not objected to on the ground of in-
definiteness but it was held to be without any support in
law as stating a cause of action since the facts alleged
show that the danger was as obvious to the invitee as to
the landowner.
RES IPSA LoQuiTuR CASES
In the field of negligence law the theory of recovery
embodied in the phrase "res ipsa loquitur" has been applied
to test the sufficiency of the evidence in a variety of cases
in Maryland. 66 However, it has been unusual in Maryland
to test the sufficiency of the allegations of negligence con-
tained in a declaration by resort to the theory underlying
the phrase.
In the case of Murray v. McShane,67 sometimes regarded
as an early illustration of a res ipsa loquitur situation, the
plaintiff's theory of the case was that the defendant's had
suffered or permitted the front wall of their property ad-
joining a public street to become dilapidated so that it be-
came a source of peril to persons using the street which
constituted a nuisance, and that the plaintiff had been dam-
aged by this illegal act when a brick fell out of the wall
upon his head. A demurrer to the declaration setting forth
this theory was overruled. The main contention of the
defendant was that the plaintiff was a trespasser in seating
himself uninvited within the door of the house for the pur-
pose of adjusting his shoe.
In Hearn v. Quillen,6" the Plaintiff's declaration read as
follows:
".. . for that the said defendants, on the twenty-ninth
day of November, in the year eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, were in possession of a steam saw-mill,
situated in Worcester County, and were running and
managing the same in the manufacture of lumber, and
that John S. Quillen, the said plaintiff, by reason of
'Farinholt, "Res Ipsa Loquitur" (1949), 10 M. L. R. 337; Thomsen,
"Presumption8 and Burden of Proof in Re8 Ipsa Loquitur Case i Mary-
land" (1939), 3 M. L. R. 285.
- 52 Md. 217 (1879).
-94 Md. 39, 42, 50 A. 402 (1902).
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the insufficiency of the house, then and there being
built by the said defendants as a covering for said
mill, in and about which the said John S. Quillen was
then employed by the defendants, was greatly injured
by the falling of said house, and the defendants did
not use due care in reference to the said house, but the
said John S. Quillen did use due care ......
The Court held a demurrer to the declaration properly
to have been overruled, saying: 69
"The declaration although brief contains all of the
allegations essential to the plaintiff's case and sub-
stantially gratifies the requirements of the Code in ref-
erence to the form of pleading to be used in cases like
the present one. It avers the plaintiff's employment
by the defendants to labor in their sawmill, and that
while he was engaged in performing the labor at the
mill in the exercise of due care he was greatly injured
by the falling upon him, by reason of its insufficiency,
of the roof being erected by the defendants over the
mill and that the defendants did not use due care in
the premises."
In affirming the lower court's action in refusing to take
the case from the jury for want of evidence legally suffi-
cient to maintain the plaintiff's case, the Court said: "The
fact that the roof fell under the circumstances disclosed by
the record while in the course of construction was, until
otherwise explained, prima facie evidence of the insuffi-
ciency of the building." This language, plus the authori-
ties cited in support thereof, indicate that the Court had in
mind as one theory of recovery that embodied in the phrase
res ipsa loquitur, although the phrase was not used.
The Court in DeCola v. Cowan,7 thus summarizes the
plaintiff's amended declaration:
"The amended declaration, on which the case was
tried below, alleges that, while the three defendants
were together engaged in erecting the building in ques-
tion, the plaintiff was passing along the sidewalk in
Ibid. The authority of this decision has been doubted by Judge Dennis
in State, use of Cherry v. Stewart & Co., Daily Record, March 22, 1939, and
Judge O'Dunne in Seeger v. Janocha, Daily Record, March 27, 1941. How-
ever, it is cited by Judge Markell in the Livingstone case, supra, n. 1, as
authority for the proposition that no great particularization of facts and
circumstances is necessary in stating a cause of action for negligence.
102 Md. 551, 552, 62 A. 1026 (1906).
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front of it using due care and caution when 'a brick
or large substance fell or was thrown from the build-
ing, being so erected as aforesaid by said defendants,
by the carelessness and want of due care of the said
defendants, their servants and agents', and struck her
on the head and seriously injured her."
The sufficiency of this declaration is not discussed by
the Court in holding that the evidence offered by the plain-
tiff was sufficient to require the defendants to explain the
falling of the brick.
Strasburger v. Vogel,7 was a similar case wherein the
declaration charged negligence in similar general language.
Again, the sufficiency of the declaration was not discussed
for it appeared from the evidence that the brick was
caused to fall by the acts of third persons.
The Court, in Chesapeake Iron Works v. Hochschild,
Kohn & Co.,72 approved the granting of a prayer which
stated in effect that a finding that the defendants, while
moving a heavy piece of structural iron, permitted and
allowed it to strike a valve or pipe on the plaintiff's prem-
ises with such force as to break the same, would be prima
facie evidence of negligence which, unless rebutted, justi-
fied a verdict for the plaintiffs. The opinion states that
the negligence charged in the declaration was that the
defendant, while moving a heavy piece of structural iron
"wrongfully and negligently permitted the same to strike
against and break a valve or pipe upon plaintiff's said
premises, connected with an automatic sprinkler system
therein situated."
Heim v. Roberts,73 was an action to recover for personal
injuries received by the infant plaintiff while walking on
the sidewalk in front of the defendant's premises when
lumber there piled fell upon him. The Court summarizes
the allegations of negligence against the defendant prop-
erty owner as follows: 7
"The negligence charged against the defendant,
which is the gravamen of the action, is that he, being in
possession of the premises in front of which the lumber
was piled, 'directed or knowingly permitted it to be
piled, as aforesaid'. that is, 'in so careless and negligent
a manner as to cause it to fall', 'although he knew or,
- 103 Md. 85. 63 A. 202 (1906).
"119 Md. 303, 86 A. 345 (1912).
"135 Md. 600, 109 A. 329 (1919).
- Ibid., 604.
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in the exercise of ordinary care, ought to have known
that the piling of said lumber in the place aforesaid
rendered the said sidewalk dangerous for persons hav-
ing occasions rightfully to use the same.'"
A prayer that the evidence offered did not tend to show
the negligence of the defendant as alleged in the declaration
was held properly refused, and the submission of the case
to the jury upon the inference of negligence arising from
the fall of lumber under the circumstances was held proper.
Apparently, it was assumed that these cases justified
general allegations of negligence where res ipsa loquitur
applied. Thus, in State use of Cherry v. Stewart Co., Inc.,"
the essential allegations of the declaration were stated to be:
"That the defendant . .. owning or operating and
conducting a retail store and restaurant ... that Helen
Cherry... on January 18, 1938 was a customer in said
store and by reason of the insufficiency of a chair
therein on which she tried to sit, said chair suddenly
broke and collapsed whereby she was mortally injured
and died on April 8, 1938 . . . that the defendant did
not use due care in reference to said chair, but the said
Helen Cherry did use due care,", etc.
The Court (Dmvms, C. J.), said:
"Since the allegation of negligence is general and
not specific, it is obvious that the plaintiffs rely upon
the doctrine expressed in the sonorous Ciceronian
phrase 'res ipsa loquitur', the thing speaks for itself.
That imposes upon the Court no concern with the
matter of contributory negligence or preponderance of
proof, but only to determine if the declaration sets up
a legal cause of action based upon primary negligence;
and does state facts which speak for themselves.
"The rules applied are the same whether the point
be raised by demurrer or by prayer."
The opinion concluded that the collapse of a chair was
an accident of a nature consistent with the absence of negli-
gence on the defendant's part and that being so, the de-
murrer was sustained on the ground that the allegations of
negligence were too general.
'" Baltimore City Court-filed March 20, 1939, Daily Record, March 22,
1939.
[VOL. XI
1950] PLEADING NEGLIGENCE IN MARYLAND 121
The genesis of the rule adopted in the Livingstone case,
that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of pleading, may be seen
in Bohlen v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,7" which involved a suit
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.7 Plaintiff's in-
juries were alleged to have been due to the negligence
of the defendant, Martin, "its agents, servants or employees,
for their failure and negligent failure to provide him a
safe place in which to work, and for their failure and
negligent failure to warn him and other employees of The
Williams Construction Company, of the possibility of the
explosion of any of the metal drums mentioned aforesaid,
if and when they were in close proximity of fire, although
for many days, the defendant, its agents, servants or em-
ployees had seen the plaintiff and other employees of The
Williams Construction Company burning the debris afore-
said in the near proximity of the metal drums aforesaid,
and without negligence or want of due care on the part
of the plaintiff thereunto contributing."
The plaintiff, in oral argument on appeal, claimed that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The Court
first pointed out that the allegations of the declaration
plainly do not set out the necessary requirements for appli-
cation of the doctrine and then, without citation of author-
ity, said : 7
"The doctrine res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
pleading. It relates to burden of proof and sufficiency
of evidence. When it is applicable, for example, be-
tween passenger and carrier in case of collision be-
tween two trains of the same railroad, the fact of the
collision is evidence of negligence in the operation of
the trains. The declaration must allege negligent
operation causing the collision not merely the evi-
dence; to wit, the collision, from which negligent opera-
tion may be inferred."
The opinion in the instant case quotes this passage from
the Bohlen case and states that the first two sentences state
what seems to be universally recognized and the last two
at least state Maryland law of pleading. The effect of the
decision is that where the allegations of negligence are too
indefinite to state a cause of action, their sufficiency may
" 67 A. 2d 251 (Md. 1949).
" Supra, n. 57.
" Supra, n. 76, 254.
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not be aided by resort to the theory expressed by the phrase
res ipsa loquitur.
It has been suggested that the question whether res ipsa
loquitur has application to the pleadings should turn on
the manner in which negligence is required to be pleaded
-whether generally or particularly."9 Thus, it is said that
in jurisdictions where negligence may be pleaded as an
ultimate fact, the need for applying res ipsa loquitur as a
rule of pleading is slight. But where negligence must be
stated with particularity, the use of res ipsa loquitur has
been urged to test the sufficiency of the pleading, for the
reasons that the plaintiff does not know the specific facts in
the first place, and secondly, the doctrine may be waived
by the pleading of specific acts of negligence.
The Maryland Code forms and judicial opinions relating
to the manner of pleading negligence do not require great
particularity in pleading negligent conduct. Indeed, in
some situations rather general allegations with but slight
particularization of facts and circumstances have been held
sufficient. The need for resort to the theory of res ipsa
loquitur to state a cause of action for negligence is not
great under this system, as is demonstrated by the multi-
tude of cases wherein the pleading requirements have been
met, and res ipsa loquitur applied to the proof to allow
recovery. Moreover, in Maryland the making of specific
allegations of negligence, at least when coupled with the
usual general allegation, does not preclude or restrict the
right to resort to res ipsa loquitur to test the sufficiency of
the evidence produced at the trial."0 The leading effect,
then, of the decision in the Livingstone case is to bury the
problem of the application of the theory of res ipsa loquitur
until at least the plaintiff's evidence has been presented at
the trial.
The Court was not disposed to decide the application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the fall of the bicycle
here, saying that it was not conceivable that the case could
be tried without the evidence showing more circumstances
than those alleged in this declaration.
This reluctance under the circumstances to theorize
about the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be readily un-
derstood. It is submitted that experience has demonstrated
that ordinarily it is not necessary to apply the doctrine at
"Hargett, "Res Ip8a Loquitur As A Rule of Pleading" (1937), 11 U. of
Cinn. L. Rev. 375, 379.
8Lawson v. Clawson, 177 Md. 333, 340, 9 A. 2d 755 (1939).
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the pleading stage in Maryland. Nor does the Livingstone
case present insurmountable pleading obstacles. Had the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negligently posi-
tioned the bicycle without adequate support at a place
where it was likely to be jostled and fall upon a business
invitee, these allegations would have been deemed a suffi-
cient statement of the facts constituting negligent conduct
on the part of the defendant, assuming that the danger was
not equally apparent to the plaintiff.
Exceptional cases may arise where the rule of the Liv-
ingstone case will create more difficult problems for the
Maryland pleader. Such a case is State of Maryland, use
of Ortiz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc."1 This was a suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
under the Maryland wrongful death statute to recover
damages sustained by the equitable plaintiffs when their
decedent met his death while a passenger in the airplane of
the defendant company which suddenly crashed while in
flight near Bainbridge, Maryland. The complaint alleged
that the crash and death resulted from negligence and lack
of care on the part of the defendant, its agents and servants.
The defendant demanded particulars of this general charge
of negligence. The Court ordered the plaintiffs to state
the particulars or show cause why they could not make the
complaint more specific within thirty days after the publica-
tion of the final findings of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a petition in which they
stated they were unable to be more specific and attached
a copy of the report of the C. A. B. which concluded that
the probable cause of the crash was a "sudden loss of con-
trol, for reasons unknown, resulting in a dive to the ground".
The plaintiffs prayed that the Court require the defendant
to answer. Thereupon, the defendant moved to dismiss on
the grounds that no specific negligence had been charged
and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.
The Court concluded that under the Maryland law, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable, yet the com-
plaint should not be dismissed and the plaintiffs should be
given an opportunity to present whatever evidence was
available at a trial.8 2
"United States District Court, Maryland, No. 3850 Civil Action (1948).
8 Chief United States District Judge Coleman, in his oral opinion, said:
"We should not stretch the technicalities of pleading too far and say that
the allegations are not adequate because the whole argument today has
resulted from an utter impossibility of making such allegations as would
normally be required." Detailed statement of the circumstances constituting
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In a similar case in the State courts, the pleader would
no doubt be required to be more definite. But what more
is there that he is likely to know or could add? To get
over the pleading hurdle he may have to make specific
charges of negligence which he has no intention of attempt-
ing to prove, since under the Maryland rule specific allega-
tions of negligence do not preclude or restrict the right to
resort to res ipsa loquitur3 Such pleading would defeat
the fundamental purposes of the Maryland system of plead-
ing by raising false issues and misinforming rather than
informing the defendant of the charge he is to meet.
Advocates of the system of a simplified pleading em-
bodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may regard
the opinion in the Livingstone case as expressing a rather
technical view of a declaration for negligence.8 4 They may
point to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Official Form 9, Appendix of Forms, 5 to indicate the simple
nbn-technical view of the Federal Rules as to a complaint
for negligence. But not all causes of action for negligence
may be as generally stated under the Federal Rules as the
one illustrated by Form 9, where the wrong is closely akin
to trespass to the person. Thus, Official Form 14 "Com-
plaint for Negligence under Federal Employer's Liability
Act" and Official Form 15, "Complaint for Damages Under
Merchant Marine Act" contemplate some brief statement
of the defendant's negligent conduct.86 It is submitted that
all the opinion in the instant case requires is some brief
statement without undue particularization of the defen-
dant's negligent conduct which was totally lacking and
could readily have been supplied as heretofore indicated.
The wisdom of the adoption by the Court of a rule which
in effect buries the problem of the application of the theory
of recovery embodied in the phrase res ipsa loquitur until
the trial may also be questioned. The argument may be
made that the application of res ipsa loquitur is a question
of substantive law,87 which should be issuable on demur-
negligence is ordinarily not necessary under the Federal Rules. A general
allegation of negligence is sufficient except that a motion for a more definite
statement may be granted where the allegations are so general as not to
disclose what is involved in the case. BARRON AND HoLIzoFF, FEDERAL PRAc-
TICE AND PROCEDURE, Vol. 1, Sec. 270.
Supra, n. 80.
"CLARK: SIMPLIFIED PLEADING (1943), 2 F. R. D. 456; BAxRRON AND
HOLTZOFF, op. cit., supra, n. 82.
Title 28 U. S. C. A.
UKlug v. Palmer, 2 F. R. D. 273 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1942).
Compare Potts v. Armour, 183 Md. 483, 486, 39 A. 2d 552 (1945) ; Lach-
man v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 160 F. 2d 496 (C. C. A. 4th, 1947).
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rer, or on a motion for a more definite statement, 9 or on a
motion to strike 0
In Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airplines Corp., the
Court, speaking of the application of res ipsa loquitur to an
airplane crash, said: "It is obviously desirable to determine
this basic question as near the inception of the actions as
possible.""' And other courts, while recognizing that
res ipsa loquitur relates to burden of proof and sufficiency
of evidence, neverthless hold that it should have and does
have its concomitant rule of pleading.2
In Maryland, the Bench and Bar in general are well
satisfied with the present system of simplified common law
pleading. Two committees of the Court of Appeals over a
period of approximately nine years have seen fit to recom-
mend but one new rule relating solely to pleading.93 The
code forms, now in use for almost a century, have not been
revised nor have new forms been added. Despite the
general excellance of the system, the fact that it may lead
to "barren appeals" and "barren victories" makes fairly de-
batable the question whether some innovations should not
be made.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACT AMENDED TO INCLUDE
SUIT AGAINST VESSEL IN MARITIME TORTS
During the 1949 session of the General Assembly of
Maryland, the Maryland "Lord Campbell's Act" was
amended. Article 67, Section 1, of the Maryland Code,
now provides:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect
or default is such as would (if death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
P State, use of Cherry v. Stewart & Co., supra, n. 75; Cohn v. United Air
Lines Transport Corp., 17 F. Supp. 865 (D. C. Wyo. 1937).
If the doctrine were determined to be applicable, the motion would be
denied; if not applicable, the motion would be sustained. Zichler v. St. Louis
Pub. Ser. Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S. W. 2d 654, 658 (1933); Gebhardt v.
McQuillen, 230 Iowa 181, 297 N. W. 301 (1941).
0Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., (D. C. D. C.), 76 F. Supp.
940, 6 A. L. R. 2d 521 (1948).
1 Ibid., 942.
12 Kaemmerling v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 2 F. 2d 574, 579 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924). See also, Hargett, op. cit., supra, n. 79.
"General Rules of Practice and Procedure, Pleading Rule 1.
